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The Winning Strategy of the Late-Comer: 
How Korea Was Awarded the UAE Nuclear Power Contract 
 
Ki-Chan Park1, Françoise Chevalier2 
 
This case study examines the successful winning strategy of the Korean 
KEPCO consortium against the French AREVA consortium on the $20 billion 
nuclear power plant contract with the United Arab Emirates. Applying the „Ser-
M‟ paradigm, the two consortia were subjected to a detailed comparative 
analysis in terms of cost and lead time of construction, core technology, major 
actors‟ leadership, and collaborative efforts of consortium members. This case 
analysis revealed that the relatively lower price, shorter lead-time, and above 
all the „animal spirited‟ leadership appeared to be the most significant strengths 
that drove the success of the Korean consortium in winning this historical 
contract.  
 
Field of Research: Business Strategy, Human Resource Management  
 
1. Introduction 
 
A Korean consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) has won 
a $20 billion contract to develop civilian nuclear power plants (NPP) for the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), beating French, US and Japanese rivals to win one of the 
world's largest nuclear tenders on offer. “How could the Korean consortium, as a late-
comer, be awarded the historical contract?” The answer could be derived from the 
anatomy of each consortium‟s competences and its operating mechanism in a form 
of case analysis. The world‟s NPP technology was previously vested in only five 
countries: the United States, France, Japan, Russia and Canada. The deal is worth 
40 billion US$, inclusive of future operating costs. Construction of the reactors alone 
will cost $20 billion, which is equivalent to exporting 1 million mid-sized passenger 
cars or 180 oil tankers capable of transporting 300,000 tons of crude oil. The deal is 
expected to create 110,000 jobs over the next 10 years (MKE, 2010). It is also 
expected to lead to contracts for Korean companies to the tune of another $20 billion 
for the operation, maintenance and fuel supply of the reactors during their 60-year 
lifespan.  
 
Actually, nuclear company market share is distributed among Westinghouse (US) 
around 28%, AREVA (France) at 24%, GE (US) with 20%, AEP (Russia) with 10%, 
and AECL (Canada) with 5% (Daishin Securities, 2009a). The UAE order places 
South Korea among the leaders with good prospects for future growth. There are 432 
nuclear plants operating in the world; however, the World Nuclear Association (WNA) 
predicts substantial growth, forecasting that 430 additional nuclear plants will be built 
by 2030, and 1,400 by 2050 (WNA, 2010b). Nuclear power, despite the enormous 
capital cost of a nuclear generating facility, has attracted attention largely due to 
spreading concerns over greenhouse gas emissions, the growing expense of fossil 
fuels, and a growing desire to move away from coal and gas-fired energy sources.i  
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Our interest is laid upon that even though the Korean consortium has newly 
appeared in the global NPP arena, we suspect that there will be no „free lunch‟ for 
the Korean consortium, and this winning „David‟ strategy might be successful only in 
winning the present „battle‟, but not the expanding future „war‟ in nuclear power 
contracts.     
 
2. Methodology and Analysis Design  
 
This case study focuses on using the Ser-M paradigm to analyze Korea‟s 
competitiveness in NPP technology, and how it won a mega-order. The respective 
model is conceived from the Diamond Model of Michael Porter (1990). „Ser-M 
paradigm‟ and „mechanism-based view‟ (MBV), suggested by professor Dong-Sung 
Cho of Seoul National University, are focused on the interactions among the Subject 
(S), environment (e), and resources (r) and their integration into a dynamic 
mechanism (M). The central concept of this paradigm is the mechanism, which is 
composed of three attributes - coordinating, learning and selecting mechanism (Cho, 
2006; Park, 2010). We know that the success of a company could be explained with 
a single factor at a given time, but that particular factor will not be enough to describe 
the total context or the long-term success of the company. Even the individual 
success factors such as the subject, the environment and the resource are such 
important to analyze, what is far more important is the process, the structure or the 
system in which the individual factors interact with one another to create the success 
(Cho, 2004). Applying the MBV and the Ser-M paradigm, we firstly analyzed each of 
the three factors „S‟, „e‟, and „r‟, followed by the dynamic context of „M (mechanism)‟ 
of this NPP export business process. Besides the press release or internet sources, 
working as a special consultant for KEPCO (Park) and for AREVA (Chevalier), and 
various information and supports from each consortium were available for this case 
analysis.  
 
3. Subject: Leadership and Strategy  
 
Here, the „subject‟ factors, we will firstly look at which companies performed the 
leading roles in this success story. KEPCO & KHNP: Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power 
(KHNP) is the largest among the six power generating subsidiaries being led by CEO 
Jong-shin Kim who interestingly was awarded the Légion d'honneur from the French 
government in 2008. KHNP was separated from KEPCO in April 2001, accounting 
for approximately 25% of electricity producing facilities, hydro and nuclear combined. 
KHNP also operates NPPs in Kori, Yonggwang, Ulchin and Wolsong, and several 
hydroelectric power generation facilities in the Hangang system, providing 
approximately 40% of the national power supply. 
 
KEPCO-KPS: KEPCO-Korea Plant Service & Engineering (KEPCO-KPS) started to 
provide maintenance services to overseas NPPs in April 1993, when technological 
support was given to change fuel for No.1 nuclear reactor in the Angra NPP, Brazil. 
At present, KEPCO-KPS is providing maintenance services in nine core fields for the 
maintenance of overseas NPPs, including changes in fuels for NPPs. The company 
is responsible for the management of maintenance services for the UAE project. 
KOPEC: Korea Power Engineering Company Inc. (KOPEC) is firmly committed to 
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continuously improving the safety and economical viability of nuclear power based 
on technical know-how and manpower resources developed through designing every 
single NPP in Korea. The company is responsible for designing NPPs for the UAE 
project. 
  
Hyundai E&C: The Hyundai Engineering & Construction participated in the 
construction of NPP in the early 1970s. Since then, it has developed into a leading 
company in the construction of Korean NPPs with Samsung C&T. 
 
Samsung C&T: Samsung Construction & Trading Corporation plans to use the 
Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) turnkey method for engineering, 
construction, maintenance and repairs during project life cycles. The EPC method is 
especially effective for building projects in the energy and petrochemical industries.  
 
Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co. Ltd.: Doosan Heavy Industries & 
Construction Co., being a unique Korean company that specializes in power plants, 
is equipped with the highest level of technology, especially in the area of nuclear 
power generation. With its turnkey production lines and management systems for 
materials, design, construction, testing and services, maintenance and repair, 
Doosan is strengthening its position as a leading provider of nuclear power systems 
in both Korean and international markets.  
 
Toshiba and Westinghouse: Toshiba has balance-of-plant and major component 
capabilities that Westinghouse did not have before. Toshiba‟s size and financial 
strength give Westinghouse even greater ability to compete in the new plant 
business. Toshiba has constructed 17 NPPs in Japan. Most were turnkey contracts 
that included the balance of the plant. This experience, combined with the existing 
supply chain, is of great benefit in the construction of new plants. Clearly, Toshiba is 
committed to providing full support to Westinghouse‟s activities in the new-build 
market, not only in U.S. but around the world. KEPCO formed a consortium with 
Westinghouse of US and Toshiba Power Systems of Japan because there are still 
areas that require various technologies patented by those companies. But experts 
say it is only a matter of time before Korea finds a cost-efficient way to replicate them 
and become completely self-sufficient in terms of nuclear power technology 
(KEPCO, 2010).  
 
AREVA: Ranked first in the global nuclear power industry, AREVA‟s unique 
integrated offering covers every stage of the fuel cycle, reactor design and 
construction, and related services. In addition, the group is expanding its operations 
in renewable energies. AREVA is also a global leader in electricity transmission and 
distribution and offers its customers a complete range of solutions for greater grid 
stability and energy efficiency. Sustainable development is a core component of the 
group‟s industrial strategy. AREVA‟s activities are organized into six business 
groups. Mines groups the uranium mines exploration and operation activities. The 
front-end converts and enriches the uranium and designs the fuel for the nuclear 
reactors. Reactors and services groups the activities of design and construction of 
nuclear reactors and propulsion and research reactors, and the activities of 
maintenance of the NPPs. The back-end recycles the spent fuel and provides 
Park & Chevalier 
224 
 
transport, clean-up and dismantling services. Renewable energy develops wind 
energy, bio energy, solar power and hydrogen power solutions and transmission and 
distribution (AREVA, 2009b). All over the world, AREVA supplies its customers with 
solutions for carbon-free power generation, electricity transmission and distribution. 
With its knowledge and expertise, AREVA plays a leading role in meeting the world‟s 
energy needs (AREVA, 2009a; AREVA‟s web site).  
 
3.1 Leading Characters of Winning the Deal 
 
Each company of the Korean consortium has advantages over the strong 
competitors such as the French nuclear group AREVA, and a consortium of General 
Electric of the US and Hitachi of Japan. However, technology alone does not 
determine success or failure in business (Barney, 1991; BBC, 2009; Park, 2010). In 
particular the diplomatic skills of the exporting country must complement it (MK, 
2009). The US and France, which competed with the KEPCO consortium in this bid, 
have close ties with the UAE, even operating military bases there. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy visited the UAE just after the NPP bid was announced, to support 
his country, offering to deploy more soldiers to the UAE, replace its fighter jets and 
even open a branch of the Louvre in the desert. Korea seemed to face 
insurmountable odds competing with such heavyweights in the NPP industry (MK, 
2009; Daishin Security, 2009a). But it was able to catch up because it showcased 
the world‟s best operation rate for NPP and the least plant stoppages, while the 
Korean government provided „behind-the-scenes‟ support. President Lee, who had 
been commanding the negotiations, flew to the UAE in the final phase to provide the 
push needed to seal the deal. The success of such major deals depends on the 
diplomatic skills of a country‟s leader. President Sarkozy aggressively pitches French 
NPPs, fighter planes and submarines, just as the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin played a key role in the success of winning the 2014 Winter Olympics bid.  
 
3.2 Leadership of Kim Ssang-Soo: Innovative Management 
Mindset 
 
The CEO of KEPCO, Mr. Kim Ssang-soo, said “This project will be remembered as a 
surprising event which had not been expected. It couldn‟t have been achieved 
without President Lee‟s active salesmanship and the strong support of the 
government. Through this, Korea‟s new reactor APR 1400 has been recognized as 
the top NPP by experts around the world.”  
 
 „Report 123‟: After Kim Ssang-Soo was appointed as CEO of KEPCO every 
report within the company was limited to three pages, following „the principle of 
report 123‟, including all required information. This innovative principle halved a 
bit the company‟s paper expenses, but the potential savings of this scheme have 
got nothing to do with saving paper; that‟s not the purpose. The purpose is better, 
more succinct reports, written quicker with a focus only on essential facts, easier 
flow of information and ultimately faster decision-making. He prefers to improve 
things from the beginning, even though it looks like a trivial detail. The principle of 
management is the first innovative code of CEO Kim (KEPCO, 2010). 
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 'Ssang-Kal' management: His nickname „Ssang-Kal (dual-knives)‟ came from his 
name Ssang-Su in Korean and his firm character. He got this nickname from his 
CEO era of LG Electronics. As a CEO he disposed matters intelligently, definitely 
and quickly. When he was nominated as CEO of KEPCO, he started a sweeping 
organizational reform to completely replace its current structure based on 
hierarchy of rank and seniority with a team-based system combined with 
assigning personnel to positions according to their ability. He always stressed 
that “Our aim is not only to become No. 1 in the local industry, but to compete 
with global leading players such as GE, Samsung Electronics and POSCO”. 
 
 Tear-down and redesign – “5% of minor changes are impossible but 30% of 
innovative changes are not impossible”: TDR is the trade mark of President Kim 
with his management innovation. “If we try to improve 5% things of the 
company‟s efficiency, we only attempt to raise the efficiency within the manner 
that we are doing. However in terms of increasing 30% efficiency, things should 
be changed from the beginning to solve the fundamental problems”. 
 
 CEO at the forefront: He is too active to remain idle. He believes that his 
decisions and efforts can influence everything for the future of company and his 
staffs in the company. He runs the company with the belief about the important 
role of CEO in terms of business innovation, and should contribute to the society 
where they belong. He emphasized that the innovation of management needs to 
be processed by a CEO who knows well about the whole context of the 
operation. He called it „strategic top-down management‟. As the commander 
taking care of the project for bidding, he made desperate efforts, being a model 
leader, to win the deal. He was deployed to the front lines with his staff as well as 
with other companies. 
 
3.3 ‘War Room’: The Symbol of Crisis Management 
 
KEPCO formed a „War Room‟ in the second basement of its Seoul headquarters for 
75-80 executives from the companies to coordinate the proposal and sales push. 
Huge signs around the room bore slogans such as “UAE Nuclear Exports, We Must 
Do It!” and “Go UAE, Yes We Can!” His innovative management style and type of 
character contributed to take on the position of a leader in charge of the project. 
Early in the UAE bidding process, many observers expected that it would mainly be 
a contest between the French AREVA consortium and the US-Japanese consortium 
that included General Electric and Hitachi. He devoted himself to winning the bid for 
building NPPs in the UAE even under the worst of conditions, by organizing a project 
team in the basement at KEPCO to seek cooperation with other businesses and 
concentrate on the goal for 7 months. With his passion for winning the bid, the 
Korean consortium was able to achieve another milestone for Korea, which has also 
emerged over the last four decades from being a recipient of international aid to an 
economic powerhouse that now helps other countries grow. Finally, President Kim of 
KEPCO has succeeded in the remarkable achievement of winning one of the world‟s 
largest NPP deals (KEPCO, 2010; SERI, 2009). “How can it be possible?”  
 
The reasons come firstly from AREVA: „Lack of being closely united in France‟, „Loss 
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of cost competitiveness and lead time‟, „Underestimation about Korean consortium‟, 
and „Failure to provide the UAE with anything other than its technical proposal‟. On 
the other hand, Korea is an emerging powerhouse to be reckoned with in the global 
market for NPP. Although it had not yet exported any NPP, Korea still held 
advantages over its rivals as the sixth-largest nuclear power generator in the world 
(KEPCO, 2010). With 20 nuclear reactors in operation, Korea is renowned for the 
lowest shut-down time in the world. Moreover, it is highly efficient in constructing 
NPP within 48 months which the French takes 58 months on average. Also of great 
help in winning the contract were the close relations Korea has cultivated with the 
UAE, particularly in trade and construction. The UAE is the second-largest oil and 
natural gas exporter to Korea. In addition, Korean construction companies have 
been playing a leading role in the building of infrastructure in the Arab countries. 
Moreover, Korea recently concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE, 
under which it is set to extend assistance in building the Middle East, the Muslim 
country‟s nuclear program by providing nuclear technology, equipment and supplies 
for a 20-year period (MKE, 2010).  
 
4. Environment: Competence and Opportunity 
 
Here we applied the traditional SWOT analysis to investigate the strategy taken by 
the Korean consortium against the French group AREVA. 
 
4.1 Nuclear Civil Energy Market - With What Korea Dealt? 
 
The nuclear industry is completely different from other industries such as 
automobiles or electronics. An overview of the NPP market is presented to define its 
specific characteristics. The first commercial NPPs started operation in the 1950s. 
There are now some 436 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in 30 
countries, with 372,000 MWe of total capacity. They provide about 15% of the world‟s 
electricity as continuous, reliable base-load power, and their efficiency is increasing. 
Fifty-six countries operate a total of about 250 research reactors and a further 220 
nuclear reactors power ships and submarines (IEA, 2007; SERI, 2010).  
 
Park & Chevalier 
227 
 
[Tab. 1] Changes of international market for nuclear reactors (IAEA, 2008) 
 
Before market restructuring (1995) After market restructuring (2005) 
Industrial group Nature of group Industrial group Nature of group 
General Electric 
(US)  
Conglomerate/Electrical  
Manufacturer & Constructor  
General Electric  
Conglomerate/ Electric  
Constructor (Private)  
Westinghouse (US)  
Conglomerate/Electrical  
Manufacturer & Constructor  BNFL-
Westinghouse 
(include CE and 
ABB Nuclear) 
Nuclear Corporation 
Integrated (Semi-public)  
Combustion 
Engineering (US)  
Construction 
Mechanical/Boilers 
ABB (US)  
Electrical Manufacturer & 
Constructor  
Minatom  
(USSR)  
Company nuclear integrate 
Rosatom  
(ex-Minatom) 
Integrated Nuclear  
Corporation (Public) 
Framatome  
(France)  
Constructor nuclear 
specialize 
AREVA 
(Framatome ANP; 
33% Siemens) 
Integrated Nuclear  
Corporation (Public) Siemens-KWU  
(Germany)  
Electrical Manufacturer & 
Constructor  
AECL (Canada) 
Nuclear Engineering 
(Public) 
AECL (Canada) 
Nuclear Engineering 
(Public) 
 
The nuclear market is characterized by the growth in demand substituting the fossil 
fuel, and the lower cost of nuclear fuel with relatively cheap to operate. Also it is not 
an open market (few suppliers representing the traditional circle of the developed 
countries) which is gathering technological and political lobbies and economic and 
strategic alliances (MK, 2009; MKE, 2010). The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) controls this market very strictly with heavy rules on operation. Competition in 
it is fierce and ruthless and competitive advantages include industry benchmark 
(industrial reference), conditions of sale (price, support on export credit by one 
government bank and insurance), political support, and agreement of a gradual 
transfer of technology (IAEA, 2008; WNA, 2010b). 
 
[Tab. 2] Distribution of NPP export market (NEI, 2010) 
 
 AREVA BNFL/Westinghouse GE Minatom Others * 
Market Share 20% (2.6G$) 20% (2.6G$) 15% (2G$) 15% (2G$) 30% (4G$) 
*AECL Canada, Japanese manufacturers subcontract mining companies (Cameco, RTZ, BHP, etc.) 
 
4.2 United Arab Emirates – What Are Their Real Needs? 
 
Clear identification of the customer is really important and helps to overcome the 
generic weaknesses and highlight the strengths in bidding competition. Then, “what 
are their real needs as a customer?” The customer, the UAE represented by the 
Emirate Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), is located in a conflict region - Persian 
Gulf - at some 40 nautical miles from Iran. All this suggests that the UAE has a great 
need for military protection (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2009; SERI, 2009). Historically, the 
UAE had been a British protectorate (from treaty signing in 1892 till 1968), so it 
should be considered as an Arab-Muslim country with an anti-imperialist culture. This 
country has been the fastest growing in the global economy and is now preparing for 
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the post-oil era. All these factors made the UAE a new and very promising market of 
nuclear energy plant (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2009; WNA, 2010a). Regarding diplomatic 
relations and foreign policy, this country has had a close and deep relation with 
France for over a century. But the Republic of Korea established „Korea-UAE‟ 
diplomatic relations only 30 years ago on June 18, 1980.  
 
4.3 French Group - Who Is the Real Competitor? 
 
For the Korean part, the strongest competitor in this deal has been the French 
consortium, headed and led by AREVA. It is a top class company which has 
credibility and a high reputation in the nuclear industry field. It also has great 
experiences and masters the whole chain of processes which commenced by 
mining, construction and operating NPPs, and finished by the treatment and the 
recycling of radioactive wastes (AREVA, 2009; WNA, 2009b). From 1975 to 2005, its 
international market share amounted 20% and its 15 atomic reactors represented 
really good industrial references for this group (IAEA, 2008; SERI, 2006). AREVA 
possesses the highest and newest technologic designs with the higher standard of 
safety. The 3rd generation European pressurized reactor (EPR) withstands or resists 
air attacks by missile or aircraft. As the nuclear power industry represents a sensitive 
point for the French economy, AREVA benefits from the full support of the French 
government (MKE, 2009; SERI, 2010; Thomas, 2005). Nevertheless, the AREVA 
group is actually not as strong as it appears due to the following Achilles heels: 
 
 Lack of coordination between AREVA and EDF (Pilot project leadership conflict) 
 High cost of the 3rd generation EPR technology     
 Delay on the completion dates of the two latest projects to build EPRs 
 
Construction of the most powerful NPP in the world began in 2005 at Olkiluoto, 
Finland but the project did not progress as originally planned, with the delay currently 
being at least two years. The construction site of the future EPR nuclear reactor EDF 
in Flamanville, France is also delayed by at least two years to 2014 at the earliest 
compared to the original plan of 2012. And AREVA has outsourced some parts of the 
NPP construction. As a result, the costs, quality and lead times are often out of its 
control in a similar case to that presently suffering by Toyota will its brake recalls 
(MKE, 2010). 
 
4.4 SWOT Analysis - Korean versus French Consortium 
 
The SWOT analysis highlighted the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats of the Korean consortium KEPCO versus the AREVA group, as shown in 
[Tab. 3]. As the consequences of SWOT analysis, KEPCO was requested to develop 
and maintain its strengths and opportunities (S-O) strategies by cutting down the 
prices even by having dumping sales, shortening the lead time to complete the 
construction of NPP, and above all satisfying the real needs of the customers by 
juxtaposing the entrepreneurship of the CEO.  
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[Tab. 3] SWOT analysis of the KEPCO Consortium 
 
 
Also, the Korean consortium is required to intensify and strengthen its diplomatic 
relations by initiating visits of officials of both countries and regularly sitting on the 
table negotiations, to propose joint-offers or joint-value by providing the UAE with 
military cooperation (hi-tech weapons supply-military base, i.e., aircraft & missiles), 
economic cooperation (Samsung and STX Shipbuilding) and diplomatic cooperation 
and supports, and also to establish win-win alliances with IAEA, diplomatic and 
political support, and R&D for nuclear wastes management.  
 
The essence of those S-O strategies and other supplementary ones is based on 
choosing wiser and widely different activities than those of the competitors (Daishin 
Securities, 2009; SERI, 2010). Thus for this NPP contract bidding, the KEPCO 
consortium beat the AREVA consortium by differentiating the negotiation strategy 
through the virtue of its dramatically different goals. Now the remaining questions 
and future ones are “What will and what should be the next strategy of KEPCO for 
the future demand of NPPs?” 
 
5. Resource: Qualification and Mobilization 
 
Although Korea is a relative newcomer in the international market, it is recognized by 
the UAE for having cost-effectiveness and technological know-how. In the Ser-M 
model, „resources‟ stand for fundamentals and objects which should be developed 
and utilized for competitive advantages. We will identify the competitive advantage of 
the Korean consortium over the French one, focusing on the following five aspects: 
capital, labor, ability, culture, and sustainable business environments (Park, 2010).  
 
Opportunities 
& Threats 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengths & 
Weaknesses 
O T 
Enter into the restricted circle of 
nuclear reactors providers 
Win its first reference to export 
Revenues by NPP in the UAE 
Gain market share in Jordan, 
Turkey, Asian & Arabic market 
Gain experiences in the field of 
NPP; negotiation, construction, 
technologies etc. 
Control of International atomic 
energy agency (IAEA) 
Lack of solution (nuclear waste) 
Influence of French diplomacy 
& probable Franco-American 
alliances (AREVA & GE) 
Experiences in technology & 
safety standard of French group 
Others: Clean energy market 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
Korea‟s images in the 
UAE (economic/industry) 
Lower selling price 
Relative short lead time 
Alliances Opportunities  
President Lee: former 
Hyundai-man  
Sharing the historical & 
cultural similarities  
S-O strategy 
- Keep LOW-COST advantage  
(even with dumping strategy) 
- Push LEAD-TIME advantage 
(ever with „can-do‟ spirits) 
- Find CUSTOMERS-NEEDS  
(even the hidden & real needs) 
- Show TRUST-LEADERSHIP 
(ever with „top-down‟ models)  
S-T strategy 
- Intensify and expand diplomatic 
supports for potential markets      
- Win-Win alliance with IAEA  
- Political support on R&D for 
NPP core technology  
 
W 
Lack in core-technology  
Weak diplomatic relations 
W-O strategy   
- Making alliances to get win  
W-T strategy   
- Diplomatic support  
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1) Capital 
According to the data (KEPCO, 2009; AREVA, 2009b), the sales volume of KEPCO 
is bigger than AREVA. And the debt ratio of KEPCO (38.8% in 2008) is higher than 
that of AREVA (15.7% in 2008). But the debt-to-asset ratio of KEPCO is far lower 
than that of Korean private companies. The sales of both companies are increasing. 
However, net income is decreasing at these companies because of high fuel cost 
and unfavorable exchange rate.  
 
2) Labor  
KEPCO (Korea): KEPCO will supply the full scope of works and services for the UAE 
Civil Nuclear Power Program, including engineering, procurement, construction, 
nuclear fuel and operations and maintenance supports. KHNP plays a key role as 
the engineering, procurement and construction contractor and operator. KOPEC 
provides the NPP design and engineering service. Korea Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 
(KNF) provides the nuclear fuel. KPS is involved in plant maintenance. Korea Atomic 
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) plays a role in R&D activities. The non-Korean 
companies involved in the KEPCO team include Westinghouse of the US, and 
Toshiba of Japan.ii 
 
AREVA (France): AREVA is a public multinational industrial conglomerate that is 
mainly known for nuclear power. It is the only company with a presence in every 
industrial activity linked to nuclear energy: engineering, nuclear propulsion and 
reactors, treatment, recycling and stabilization. EDF is an integrated energy 
company in France with operations spanning electricity generation and electricity 
distribution. GDF is a French-based energy company active in the fields of electricity 
generation and distribution, natural gas and renewable energy. GDF Suez is the 
second-largest generator of electricity in France behind EDF. TOTAL is a French oil 
company and one of the six "Super major" oil companies in the world. Total does not 
currently have extensive involvement in nuclear power. However, in January 2008, 
Total announced that they were to sign an agreement with Suez and AREVA to 
submit an NPP project to the UAE. Meanwhile, the AREVA consortium does not have 
noticeable engineering and construction companies compared to the KEPCO 
consortium which includes Hyundai and Samsung C&T. Also KNF is in charge of 
providing nuclear power fuel. Furthermore, it has a more integrated industry portfolio 
which can induce nation-wide interest and economic effects (Lee, 2007; MKE, 2009). 
But the „hidden‟ competence for the KEPCO consortium is its human resources 
equipped with „can-do-spirit‟, „entrepreneurship‟ and „company-oriented and animal 
spirit‟. Those things are related to KEPCO‟s firm-specific organizational culture.  
 
3) Ability and Technology 
ENEC has decided to build KEPCO's APR 1400, a Generation III, 1400 Megawatt 
NPP with evolutionary improvements in safety, performance, and environmental 
impact that meet the highest international standards for safety and performance. The 
APR 1400 design was developed by the Korean nuclear industry under the 
leadership of KEPCO over a 10-year period from 1992. The first NPP in the UAE will 
be the fifth unit of the APR 1400 plants, and the „Shin-Kori‟ plants in Korea will serve 
as the „reference NPPs‟ for the UAE program.  
KEPCO‟s APR1400: The APR 1400 has been designed to meet heightened safety 
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goals developed in accordance with the latest international safety standards, which 
aim to secure an additional margin of safety to protect the public health. Its design 
incorporates more than 30 years of operational learning and resulting enhancements 
to safety, reliability and efficiency. Also it was developed to keep up with the trend of 
the international nuclear power industry. Important achievements are increasing the 
capacity from 1,000 to 1,400 megawatts and advancing and experiences gained, in 
addition to meeting the licensing requirements needs by the US regulatory agency. It 
is a design with highly improved safety and cost competitiveness using the most 
advanced technology. By deploying only a third-generation design, the UAE‟s future 
fleet of nuclear reactors will boast safety levels significantly above those of existing 
nuclear fleets that are still dominated by second-generation designs.iii  
 
AREVA‟s EPR (European Pressurized Reactor): The EPR is a 1,600 megawatt 
Generation III reactor designed for US by AREVA. It is a standardized, advanced 
design derived from the EPR currently being built in Europe. Olkiluoto, Finland but 
the project did not progress as originally planned, with the delay currently being at 
least two years. The construction site of the future EPR nuclear reactor EDF in 
Flamanville, France is also delayed by at least two years to 2014 at the earliest 
compared to the original plan of 2012. 
① Cost advantage: Cost effectiveness is one of the biggest attractions of APR 
1400 in this bidding. KEPCO suggested a construction cost/kW of 1,300U$, 
which is only 30% of that of the US-Japan consortium (http://www.chosun.com). 
② Lead time advantage: The French consortium submitted designs for its 3rd 
generation EPR, and the US-Japanese consortium submitted designs for its 
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR). All three plants are designed to 
operate for 60 years and require refueling after approximately 18 months of 
operation. While the French EPR will take 57 months to build, both ABWR and 
Korean APR1400 will take only 48 months. KEPCO‟s short construction period 
is definitely attractive to the UAE  
(http://nuclearstreet.com/blogs/nuclear_power_news). 
③ Safety advantage: KEPCO has the lowest „unplanned shutdown‟ rate in the 
world at only 0.5 times per month compared to 3.2 times per month in France, 
which is more than 6 times larger (Lee, 2007). 
 
4) Culture      
Cultural factors are one of the important keys in this bidding. Doing the business with 
French companies, we feel that they are politically neutral, culturally democratic and 
economically rational and character and rational (Chevalier, 1995). On the contrary, 
Korea business culture can be expressed as pro-government, paternalism and 
authoritarian (Cho, 2006; Park, 2010). From research and interviews with CEOs in 
Korean major companies, Park (2010) suggested a conceptual typology on 
organizational culture, which categorized Americans as „know-how‟ oriented, 
Japanese as „know-what‟ oriented, Koreans as „know-whom‟ oriented and French as 
„know-why‟ oriented. Both the French and Korean mechanisms are dynamically 
formulated and affected by the strategic behaviors of actors (Crozier & Friedberg, 
1980; Park, 2010). Then what are the differences between the French and Korean? 
And why did the Korean micro-culture appear more effective than the French in this 
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bidding? We think that this Korean organizational culture contributed to the UAE‟s 
promotion because it often results in speedy and strategic top-down decision making 
and project processing. As aforementioned in the labor part, other Korean 
organizational characteristics are „can-do-spirit‟ and „company (work) oriented spirit‟ 
which have resulted in amazing economic growth since the late sixties. We cannot 
judge which organizational culture is better, but we can suggest which organizational 
culture is likely to be more competitive. 
 
 5) Sustainability 
KEPCO: KEPCO has had a sustainability management framework since 2005 that 
focuses on the balanced consideration in four key areas; economy, environment, 
society and human resources. Accordingly, it has set „KS-GT5‟ as its goal of 
sustainability management until 2015. KEPCO Sustainability (KS) stands for 
becoming the best institute of sustainability management in Korea, and Global Top 5 
(GT5) for elevating the level of KEPCO‟s sustainability management to the level of 
the global top 5 energy companies. KEPCO has developed implementation 
strategies and identified 12 action items in 4 major areas of sustainability 
management to achieve the goal by 2015. The 12 action guidelines have been 
aligned with the 2015 mid-to-long term strategic business plan (KEPCO, 2009). The 
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) recently reported a continuing 
gap between Korean and global companies in sustainable management. Especially 
public utilities show a 10 % gap between Korean and global companies (KCCI, 
2009). 
 
[Tab. 4] Sustainability of Korean industries 
 
Industry Global Korean Gap 
Finance & Banking  44.9 24.1 -20.8 
Automobile  49.7 35.2 -14.5 
Petroleum & Gas  43.9 30.6 -13.3 
Public Equipments  52.9 42.1 -10.8 
Computer, Electronics, Communication  51.2 42.2 -9.5 
Retailing  38.7 27.6 -11.1 
Chemical, Material  39.6 48.8 +9.2 
 
AREVA: AREVA‟s sustainable management policy is served by a commitment to 
ongoing improvement (AREVA, 2009a). It is implemented through a continuous 
improvement process that revolves around several commitments. It has led to the 
establishment of social and environmental performance indicators. It focused on four 
commitments: economic performance, environmental protection, community 
involvement and commitment to employees.  
 
A comparison of the resource-based competence of KEPCO with that of AREVA 
shows that KEPCO has competitive resources in labor, ability and culture. On the 
contrary, we couldn‟t find specific competence in terms of capital or from the 
sustainable environment. We can conclude that, in the resource-based view (Barney, 
1991; Cho, 2006), only the human resources, employees‟ ability, and culture-related 
factors showed their competitive advantages, as can be seen on [Tab. 5].  
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[Tab. 5] KEPCO‟s competitive resource and core competence 
 
 Core Competences of the KEPCO consortium 
Labor (HR) Excellent industry portfolio lineup, company (work)-oriented actor‟s attitude 
Ability Low construction cost, safety in operation rate, short construction period 
Culture Strategic top-down project approach, aggressive (challenging) mentality  
 
6. Mechanism: Culture and Operating Context 
 
“Panta rhei (all things are flowing)”. If we look at how someone has succeeded at 
something, we should analyze it at a strategic level in a holistic view. This is what 
Ser-M analysis is. As the Greek philosopher Herakleitos of Ephesus said, all things 
are flowing, corporate environment keeps changing, CEOs are replaced, and 
resources of corporations are transformed. KEPCO has operated and developed 
business with demanding Korean customers. As a public enterprise, it has provided 
reliable and high quality electricity to Korean customers. Due to its lack of natural 
resources, KEPCO tried to keep changing and innovating business and operations. 
Although the subjects, environments, and resources keep changing, the tangible or 
intangible systems and strategies, organizational culture, which have been built 
through all the changes, still remain and these sustainable factors represent the 
„mechanism‟ (Cho, 2006; Park, 2010). For the mechanism, we look into how these 
subject-environment-and-resource elements interacted with each other during the 3 
stages of the bidding process: starting stage, bargaining stage and pay-off stage: 
 
Starting stage: The UAE‟s evaluation of its energy needs was wide-ranging and 
concluded that the volume of natural gas would be insufficient to meet future 
demand and that the burning of liquid fuels would be both costly and negative for a 
green environment. Coal-fired power generation would be potentially cheaper but 
environmentally unacceptable, and potentially vulnerable from a security of supply 
standpoint. The deployment of renewable and other alternative energy supplies 
would only be able to supply approximately 6~7% of the required electricity 
generation capacity by 2020. These factors supported the decision to begin this 
bidding according to the five sectors below:  
 
 Economy: Well run nuclear energy plant are among the most efficient producers 
of electricity  
 Safe supply of fuel: NPPs have high availability factors (in excess of 90 %) and 
can operate for 18~24 months on a single fuel load  
 Environment: Nuclear plants emit no greenhouse gases and represent an 
important tool for combating climate change  
 Industrial development: Sustainable nuclear energy program will create new 
service industries and high-value jobs, while enhancing economic development 
throughout the UAE  
 Human resource development: Essential for the success of NPP project in the 
UAE 
 
Among the six consortia from four countries, three teams demonstrated that their 
technology and safety programs fully meet the latest international standards, so that 
these three teams were accepted as final candidates. 
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Bargaining stage: ENEC‟s year-long prime contractor selection process was 
designed to identify the best long-term partner for the UAE as it undertook its civil 
nuclear energy program. The process was guided by the policy of the UAE on the 
evaluation and potential development of peaceful nuclear energy, which set strict 
standards for safety and security, non proliferation and sustainability. ENEC focused 
on five core criteria in reaching its final decision: safety, deliverability, contract 
compliance, human resource development, and commercial competitiveness. 
KEPCO‟s team of 75 dedicated experts evaluated the bids. Collectively, the team 
boasted of directly relevant experiences in nuclear industry. The „War room‟ was 
made up of experts in the following fields: NPP safety, design and construction; 
operations and maintenance; nuclear quality assurance, supply chain management 
and procurement; nuclear fuel procurement and management (including safeguards, 
non proliferation and spent fuel management); siting analysis (including 
environmental impact assessment, seismology, geology, meteorology and 
hydrology); finance (including generation cost modeling and project finance); legal 
and contracting; program management; utility operations; and communications and 
community relations. iv  Finally, as we know, ENEC announced that the Korean 
KEPCO consortium had won the competition at the Emirates Palace Hotel, Abu 
Dhabi at 13:30 Dec. 27, 2009. 
 
Pay-off stage: Despite the success of the Korean consortium in winning the 
contract, several negative effects appeared as many mass media and experts 
analyzed that this project will be unprofitable and that other countries will enjoy any 
real benefits. Nevertheless, we believe that the benefits for Korea will be 
immeasurable. When comparing the history of economics and technologies with 
advanced countries, it is clear that the winning of this project cannot be a 
disadvantage for Korea since it represents the first step to enter in the restricted NPP 
export market, and will enable Korea could develop and invest the fundamental 
sciences. But it will take time. The world economy is unstable. The financial crisis 
and recession are continuing. Some experts even forecast that it could worsen again 
in the near future. In this negative circumstance, Korea has picked up the business 
to enter and to invest. It can be a great turning point for Korea. The demand for 
NPPs will increase because they are environmentally friendly and efficient. In this 
growing industry with the tremendous first foot print made by Korea, the remaining 
question is how to win the next competition. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The Ser-M paradigm-based analysis of this case study requires a far more in-depth 
reflection to clearly determine the real mechanism of the bidding competition. 
Nevertheless, the results of our analysis can be summarized as follows [Tab. 6]. 
Based on the highlighted summary of each Ser-M factor, we could answer negatively 
to each of the following questions: 
 
(S) Was the leadership of the President Kim the only factor to win the competition?  
(E) Was the environment (political, economic, cultural) the only factor to win?  
(R) Was the resource of KEPCO consortium the only factor to win?  
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(M) Korea will show a virtuous circle of actual mechanism in the next round?  
 
 [Tab. 6] Korea‟s bidding advantages on ser-M analysis 
 
SUBJECT 
[Leadership & Participation] 
 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
[The 1
st
 Export of NPP] 
 
RESOURCE 
[Expertise in Operation] 
Quick reaction & decisions 
Vision for long-term relations 
Ready to export NPP  
(by former CEO of KEPCO)  
Can-do & challenging attitude 
Aware of customer‟s culture  
1
st
 Plant in Middle-East 
Growing demand for NPP 
Political gaming among exporters 
The UAE‟s relation-oriented culture 
Exchange rate: Euro↓/Won↑ 
Dubai‟s liability crisis  
Low operating cost 
APR1400: Gen III, 1400MW 
Cost-effective plant design 
Low rate of unplanned 
shutdown  
Governmental supports  
 
MECHANISM 
 
The  
Core 
Values of 
Korean 
KEPCO 
Team 
 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Respect to 
Customer 
Government support: package deal  As a  
late-comer 
the Korean 
consortium 
was awarded 
contract 
Leadership: President Lee & Kim 
Profit  
Creation 
Cooperation: related organizations  
Low costs & shorter lead time  
Challenging 
Vision 
Change and 
Innovation 
High safety in maintenance 
Experienced human resources 
 
“Let‟s do it!” This is what Mohamed Al Hammadi, CEO of ENEC said after the bidding 
competition. Many criticisms remain on the method of Korea‟s victory, but the high 
entry barrier to the nuclear energy market should be remembered. We should also 
remember the black and white TV sets made by Samsung in the past. No one could 
imagine that Samsung Electronics would become the strongest challenger against 
Sony (SERI, 2009; MKE, 2010). The Korean NPP consortium is now in the beginning 
stage just like when Samsung produced black & white TVs. It was a big event. But 
now, only months‟ later, Korean people no longer talk about the great success of the 
KEPCO consortium. Their interests have been distracted by the Winter Olympic 
Games, unemployment, and the gossip world of celebrities. If some remain 
interested, they only wait for the next competition to be won, rather than remaining 
as loyal supporters.  
 
Then, “What would be the right strategy for Korea to win in the next bidding?” 
Obviously Korea needs to develop its own 5 % core technology, which presently 
depends totally on Westinghouse. This deficiency is the core issue in designing 
NPPs. Only two companies, AREVA and Westinghouse have the code. If Korea 
wants to be one of the strongest future candidates, it must attain this core technology 
as to be able to build the nuclear plant 100 % by itself. Fortunately, once more the 
Korean government declared its support in developing this core technology. 
President Lee announced that the government will provide any necessary support for 
this development and has set the goal of achieving it by 2014. Neither are the 
world‟s fastest rates of growth and democratization, Korea‟s image abroad has failed 
to keep up with these achievements, resulting in what is widely called the „Korea 
Discount‟ .  
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NOTE 
 
* Major facts of this article is available on the web from a variety of sources, 
predominantly newspaper articles, such as the Korea Herald, JoongAng Daily and 
company marketing brochures from the likes of KEPCO, AREVA and Doosan. We 
have listed most of them throughout the paper, but of course actually there will be 
many others.  
i.The original source of news topics can be found especially from the site: 
http://environmental-engineering.suite101.com/article.cfm/south_korea_exports_nuclear_power_to_uae, and 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2915051 
ii.Cited directly from the following news:  
http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1261832658351&p=1135099400124&pagena
me=WAM%2FWamLocEnews%2FW-T-LEN-FullNews 
iii.From the same source above 
iv.Also mainly from the same source 
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